The impact of information systems on organizations and markets
Communications of the ACM
Electronic markets and electronic hierarchies
Communications of the ACM
Rembrandts in the attic: unlocking the hidden value of patents
Rembrandts in the attic: unlocking the hidden value of patents
The standardization process in IT — too slow or too fast?
Information technology standards and standardization
Journal of Management Information Systems - Special section: Strategic and competitive information systems
Poaching and the Misappropriation of Information: Transaction Risks of Information Exchange
Journal of Management Information Systems
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Technology is a bundle of inventions, which are increasingly protected by intellectual property rights. Typically, these rights are owned by multiple different entities, operating in different industries and countries. Moreover, once an invention protected by intellectual property right is incorporated in a product, it becomes very difficult to substitute it with an alternative technology, especially when the product has been widely adopted. Thus, technology creators must coordinate the disparate interests of various intellectual property owners in order to create useful technology. In this paper we introduce a new theory as an extension of transaction cost economics to explain the relative merits of different governance forms vis-a-vis the creation of technology that is a bundle of inventions. From this theoretical extension, we derive a number of testable hypotheses.