Probability and statistics
Computational geometry: algorithms and applications
Computational geometry: algorithms and applications
Unit disk graph recognition is NP-hard
Computational Geometry: Theory and Applications - Special issue on geometric representations of graphs
An on-demand secure routing protocol resilient to byzantine failures
WiSE '02 Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Wireless security
SECTOR: secure tracking of node encounters in multi-hop wireless networks
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
LITEWORP: A Lightweight Countermeasure for the Wormhole Attack in Multihop Wireless Networks
DSN '05 Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
TinySeRSync: secure and resilient time synchronization in wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
TrueLink: A Practical Countermeasure to the Wormhole Attack in Wireless Networks
ICNP '06 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
A scalable wireless routing protocol secure against route truncation attacks
CMS'10 Proceedings of the 11th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
Single-Adversary Relaying Attack Defense Mechanism in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
| Hi-index | 0.01 |
In this paper, we analyze the effect of the wormhole attack on shortest-path routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks. Using analytical and simulation results, we show that a strategic placement of the wormhole when the nodes are uniformly distributed can disrupt/control on average 32% of all communications across the network. We also analyze a scenario in which several attackers make wormholes between each other and a case where two malicious nodes attack a target node in the network. We show how to evaluate the maximum effect of the wormhole attack on a given network topology. Then, we compute the maximum effect of the wormhole attack on grid topology networks and show that the attackers can disrupt/control around 40% to 50% of all communications when the wormhole is strategically placed in the network. Finally, to defend against the wormhole attack, we propose a timing-based countermeasure that avoids the deficiencies of existing timing-based solutions. Using the proposed countermeasure, the nodes do not need synchronized clocks, nor are they required to predict the sending time or to be capable of fast switching between the receive and send modes. Moreover, the nodes do not need one-to-one communication with all their neighbors and do not require to compute a signature while having to timestamp the message with its transmission time.