Highly dynamic Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector routing (DSDV) for mobile computers
SIGCOMM '94 Proceedings of the conference on Communications architectures, protocols and applications
A performance comparison of multi-hop wireless ad hoc network routing protocols
MobiCom '98 Proceedings of the 4th annual ACM/IEEE international conference on Mobile computing and networking
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Severity analysis and countermeasure for the wormhole attack in wireless ad hoc networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Wormhole-resilient secure neighbor discovery in underwater acoustic networks
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Detecting wormhole attacks in delay-tolerant networks
IEEE Wireless Communications
Routing security in wireless ad hoc networks
IEEE Communications Magazine
Detecting and avoiding wormhole attacks in wireless ad hoc networks
IEEE Communications Magazine
Wormhole attacks in wireless networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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There have been many security protocols to provide authenticity and confidentiality in wireless ad hoc networks. However, they fail to defend networks against relaying attack in which attacker nodes simply broadcast received packets without compromising any legitimate nodes. Wormhole attack is a representative example of relaying attack, in which a pair of attacker nodes relay received packets to each other and selectively drop them. The wormhole attack is known to ruin routing and communication of a network considerably, however, is not very straightforward to be accomplished due to the pairwise nature. In this paper, we introduce two new types of relaying attack, called teleport and filtering attacks that require a single attacker node only for accomplishment. We describe their accomplishment conditions and impacts on the network performance in a formal manner. We then propose a countermeasure framework against these attacks called Single-Adversary Relaying Attack defense Mechanism (SARAM), which is composed of a bandwidth-efficient neighbor discovery customized for multi-hop environments and neighbor list management combined into an on-demand ad hoc routing protocol. SARAM does not require any special hardware such as location-aware equipments and tight synchronized clocks, thus is cost-efficient as well. We show via ns-2 simulation that the new relaying attacks deteriorate the network performance significantly and SARAM is effective and efficient in defending a network against these attacks.