Artificial intelligence: the very idea
Artificial intelligence: the very idea
CNLS '89 Proceedings of the ninth annual international conference of the Center for Nonlinear Studies on Self-organizing, Collective, and Cooperative Phenomena in Natural and Artificial Computing Networks on Emergent computation
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The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory
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The Universal Computer: The Road from Leibniz to Turing
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Computers Ltd.: What They Really Can't Do
Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought
Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought
Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid
Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid
Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence
Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence
Minds and Machines
Is There a Future for AI Without Representation?
Minds and Machines
Representation in Digital Systems
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on Current Issues in Computing and Philosophy
Interaction and resistance: the recognition of intentions in new human-computer interaction
Proceedings of the Third COST 2102 international training school conference on Toward autonomous, adaptive, and context-aware multimodal interfaces: theoretical and practical issues
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The paper presents a paradoxical feature of computational systems that suggests that computationalism cannot explain symbol grounding. If the mind is a digital computer, as computationalism claims, then it can be computing either over meaningful symbols or over meaningless symbols. If it is computing over meaningful symbols its functioning presupposes the existence of meaningful symbols in the system, i.e. it implies semantic nativism. If the mind is computing over meaningless symbols, no intentional cognitive processes are available prior to symbol grounding. In this case, no symbol grounding could take place since any grounding presupposes intentional cognitive processes. So, whether computing in the mind is over meaningless or over meaningful symbols, computationalism implies semantic nativism.