CNLS '89 Proceedings of the ninth annual international conference of the Center for Nonlinear Studies on Self-organizing, Collective, and Cooperative Phenomena in Natural and Artificial Computing Networks on Emergent computation
Intelligence without representation
Artificial Intelligence
Intelligence without robots: a reply to Brooks
AI Magazine
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Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation
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How the Body Shapes the Way We Think: A New View of Intelligence (Bradford Books)
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Symbol Grounding in Computational Systems: A Paradox of Intentions
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This paper investigates the prospects of Rodney Brooks' proposal for AI without representation. It turns out that the supposedly characteristic features of "new AI" (embodiment, situatedness, absence of reasoning, and absence of representation) are all present in conventional systems: "New AI" is just like old AI. Brooks proposal boils down to the architectural rejection of central control in intelligent agents--Which, however, turns out to be crucial. Some of more recent cognitive science suggests that we might do well to dispose of the image of intelligent agents as central representation processors. If this paradigm shift is achieved, Brooks' proposal for cognition without representation appears promising for full-blown intelligent agents--Though not for conscious agents.