GPSR: greedy perimeter stateless routing for wireless networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Dynamic fine-grained localization in Ad-Hoc networks of sensors
Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Secure verification of location claims
WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
SeRLoc: secure range-independent localization for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Detecting Malicious Beacon Nodes for Secure Location Discovery in Wireless Sensor Networks
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
The effects of ranging noise on multihop localization: an empirical study
IPSN '05 Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
Robust statistical methods for securing wireless localization in sensor networks
IPSN '05 Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
Attack-resistant location estimation in sensor networks
IPSN '05 Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
Global Positioning Systems, Inertial Navigation, and Integration
Global Positioning Systems, Inertial Navigation, and Integration
Secure Hop-Count Based Localization in Wireless Sensor Networks
CIS '07 Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security
Attack-Resistant Location Estimation in Wireless Sensor Networks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
ROSETTA: robust and secure mobile target tracking in a wireless ad hoc environment
MILCOM'06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE conference on Military communications
Secure positioning in wireless networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Secure localization and location verification in wireless sensor networks: a survey
The Journal of Supercomputing
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Many secure localization algorithms have been proposed. In these algorithms, collusion attack is usually considered as the strongest attack when evaluating their performance. Also, for ensuring correct localization under the collusion attack, a necessary number of normal beacons are needed and a lower bound on this number has been established (assuming the errors of distance measurements are ignorable). In this paper, we introduce pollution attack, a more powerful attack which can succeed even when the number of normal beacons is more than the lower bound. In this attack, victim node is misled to a special chosen location, which results in a confusion of compromised beacon with normal beacon. We propose a new metric to measure the vulnerability of a normal location reference set to pollution attack, and develop two algorithms to efficiently compute the value of the proposed metric. We also present a method to judge whether the output of the localization algorithm is credible under pollution attack. Simulation results show that the pollution attack can succeed with high probability.