Uplink power control and base station association in multichannel cellular networks

Authors:
Chandramani Singh;Anurag Kumar;Rajesh Sundaresan
Affiliations:
Department of Electrical Communication Engineering, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India;Department of Electrical Communication Engineering, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India;Department of Electrical Communication Engineering, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India
Venue:
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Year:
2009

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Abstract

A combined base station association and power control problem is studied for the uplink of multichannel multicell cellular networks, in which each channel is used by exactly one cell (i.e., base station). A distributed association and power update algorithm is proposed and shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game. We consider network models with discrete mobiles (yielding an atomic congestion game), as well as a continuum of mobiles (yielding a population game). We find that the equilibria need not be Pareto efficient, nor need they be system optimal. To address the lack of system optimality, we propose pricing mechanisms. It is shown that these mechanisms can be implemented in a distributed fashion.