Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Congestion resulting from increased capacity in single-server queueing networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Networks of Learning Automata: Techniques for Online Stochastic Optimization
Networks of Learning Automata: Techniques for Online Stochastic Optimization
Stochastic learning solution for distributed discrete power control game in wireless data networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Uplink power control and base station association in multichannel cellular networks
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Selection of efficient pure strategies in allocation games
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Iterative water-filling for Gaussian vector multiple-access channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Correlated Anarchy in Overlapping Wireless Networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Architecting noncooperative networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A framework for uplink power control in cellular radio systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Dynamic power allocation games in parallel multiple access channels
Proceedings of the 5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Learning to use the spectrum in self-configuring heterogenous networks: a logit equilibrium approach
Proceedings of the 5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
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We model the interaction of several radio devices aiming to obtain wireless connectivity by using a set of base stations (BS) as a non-cooperative game. Each radio device aims to maximize its own spectral efficiency (SE) in two different scenarios: First, we let each player to use a unique BS (BS selection) and second, we let them to simultaneously use several BSs (BS Sharing). In both cases, we show that the resulting game is an exact potential game. We found that the BS selection game posses multiple Nash equilibria (NE) while the BS sharing game posses a unique one. We provide fully decentralized algorithms which always converge to a NE in both games. We analyze the price of anarchy and the price of stability for the case of BS selection. Finally, we observed that depending on the number of transmitters, the BS selection technique might provide a better global performance (network spectral efficiency) than BS sharing, which suggests the existence of a Braess type paradox.