Auction mechanism for spectrum allocation and profit sharing

  • Authors:

  • Sung Hyun Chun;Richard J. La

  • Affiliations:

  • Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering and the Institute for Systems Research, University of Maryland, College Park, MD;Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering and the Institute for Systems Research, University of Maryland, College Park, MD

  • Venue:
  • GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We examine the problem of designing an auction mechanism for dynamic spectrum sharing when there are multiple sellers and multiple buyers. First, we study the interaction among homogeneous buyers of spectrum as a noncooperative game and show the existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (SMSNE). Second, we prove that there exists an incentive for risk neutral sellers of the spectrum to cooperate to maximize their expected profits at the SMSNEs of buyers' noncooperative game. Finally, we model the interaction among the sellers as a cooperative game and demonstrate that the core of the cooperative game is nonempty. This indicates that there exists a way for the sellers to share the profits in a such manner that no subset of sellers will deviate from cooperating with the remaining sellers.