On the efficiency of sequential auctions for spectrum sharing
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Auction mechanism for spectrum allocation and profit sharing
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Wireless network virtualization as a sequential auction game
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
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IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
NETWORKING'11 Proceedings of the 10th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part II
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Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Revenue maximization in spectrum auction for dynamic spectrum access
Proceedings of the 5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Power Allocation for Two-Way Relay System Based on Sequential Second Price Auction
Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
Stochastic game for wireless network virtualization
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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We study a sequential auction for sharing a wireless resource (bandwidth or power) among competing transmitters. The resource is assumed to be managed by a spectrum broker (auctioneer), who collects bids and allocates discrete units of the resource via a sequential second-price auction. It is well known that a second price auction for a single indivisible good has an efficient dominant strategy equilibrium; this is no longer the case when multiple units of a homogeneous good are sold in repeated iterations. For two users with full information, we show that such an auction has a unique equilibrium allocation. The worst-case efficiency of this allocation is characterized under the following cases: (i) both bidders have a concave valuation for the spectrum resource, and (ii) one bidder has a concave valuation and the other bidder has a convex valuation (e.g., for the other useriquests power). Although the worst-case efficiency loss can be significant, numerical results are presented, which show that for randomly placed transmitter-receiver pairs with rate utility functions, the sequential second-price auction typically achieves the efficient allocation. For more than two users it is shown that this mechanism always has a pure strategy equilibrium, but in general there may be multiple equilibria. We give a constructive procedure for finding one equilibrium; numerical results show that when all users have concave valuations the efficiency loss decreases with an increase in the number of users.