ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Protecting Respondents' Identities in Microdata Release
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Protecting sensitive attributes in automated trust negotiation
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
On the value of private information
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
WWW '05 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on World Wide Web
On Interoperable Trust Negotiation Strategies
POLICY '07 Proceedings of the Eighth IEEE International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks
PP-trust-X: A system for privacy preserving trust negotiations
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Minimal credential disclosure in trust negotiations
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Digital identity management
An Efficient and Minimum Sensitivity Cost Negotiation Strategy in Automated Trust Negotiation
CSSE '08 Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on Computer Science and Software Engineering - Volume 03
Understanding and capturing people's privacy policies in a mobile social networking application
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing
Approximate privacy: foundations and quantification (extended abstract)
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A practical implementation of secure auctions based on multiparty integer computation
FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Sequential Bandwidth and Power Auctions for Distributed Spectrum Sharing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
An ontology based privacy protection model for third-party platform
AMT'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Active Media Technology
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The economic value of rich user profiles is an incentive for providers to collect more personal (and sensitive) information than the minimum amount needed for deploying services effiectively and securely. With a game-the-oretic approach, we show that provider competition can reduce such information requests. The key is a suitable mechanism, roughly reminiscent of a Vickrey auction subject to integrity constraints. We show that our mechanism induces rational providers to ask exactly for the user information strictly necessary to deliver their service effiectively and securely. In this framework, maximal attribute disclosures become more diæcult to achieve.