Revenue maximization in spectrum auction for dynamic spectrum access

Authors:
Ali Kakhbod;Ashutosh Nayyar;Demosthenis Teneketzis
Affiliations:
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI;University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI;University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
Venue:
Proceedings of the 5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Year:
2011

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Abstract

In this paper, we consider the revenue maximization problem in auctions for dynamic spectrum access. We assume a frequency division method of spectrum sharing with a primary spectrum owner that can divide the available spectrum into sub-bands and sell them to secondary users. We assume that a secondary user's utility function is linear in the rate it can achieve by using the spectrum. We present an incentive compatible, individual rational and revenue-maximizing mechanism that the spectrum owner can use to divide the spectrum among the strategic (selfish) secondary buyers.