iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimization and Machine Learning
Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimization and Machine Learning
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Exploring bidding strategies for market-based scheduling
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Combinatorial Auctions
Simulating combinatorial auctions with dominance requirement and loll bids through automated agents
Decision Support Systems
HIS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 8th International Conference on Hybrid Intelligent Systems
Decision-theoretic bidding based on learned density models in simultaneous, interacting auctions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
The Clock Proxy Auction for Allocating Radio Spectrum Licenses
Computational Economics
Hi-index | 0.00 |
The clock-proxy auction is a combinatorial auction which is specially designed for environments where bidders have complex preference structures (complements and substitute items), as also occurs in the spectrum licenses market. In such an intricate context, it is difficult to find an optimal strategy. Nevertheless, if a particular environment is selected, evolutionary computation techniques can be used to find some bidding patterns. This research focuses on the sale of a portion of the spectrum called "digital dividend", implementing a realistic model that could fit in most European countries. To this end, a simulator of the auction mechanism is created and a set of candidate bidding strategies are implemented. Subsequently, the developed GA tests the proposed strategies, searching for the behavior that maximizes the average profits for one bidder. Finally, the results are supported by an exhaustive validation test bed.