Zero-knowledge proofs of identity
Journal of Cryptology
Algorithmic number theory
Xor-trees for efficient anonymous multicast and reception
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Password authentication with insecure communication
Communications of the ACM
SAC '99 Proceedings of the 6th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Dynamic Accumulators and Application to Efficient Revocation of Anonymous Credentials
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
How to Prove That a Committed Number Is Prime
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
How to Make Personalized Web Browising Simple, Secure, and Anonymous
FC '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 1
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 1
Network Security Essentials: Applications and Standards (3rd Edition)
Network Security Essentials: Applications and Standards (3rd Edition)
A formal treatment of onion routing
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Poster: arbitrators in the security infrastructure, supporting positive anonymity
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Anonymous transactions in computer networks
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS)
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We present schemes for providing anonymous transactions while privacy and anonymity are preserved, providing user anonymous authentication in distributed networks such as the Internet. We first present a practical scheme for anonymous transactions while the transaction resolution is assisted by a Trusted Authority. This practical scheme is extended to a theoretical scheme where a Trusted Authority is not involved in the transaction resolution. Given an authority that generates for each player hard to produce evidence EVID (e. g., problem instance with or without a solution) to each player, the identity of a user U is defined by the ability to prove possession of said evidence. We use Zero-Knowledge proof techniques to repeatedly identify U by providing a proof that U has evidence EVID , without revealing EVID , therefore avoiding identity theft. In both schemes the authority provides each user with a unique random string. A player U may produce unique user name and password for each other player S using a one way function over the random string and the IP address of S . The player does not have to maintain any information in order to reproduce the user name and password used for accessing a player S . Moreover, the player U may execute transactions with a group of players S U in two phases; in the first phase the player interacts with each server without revealing information concerning its identity and without possibly identifying linkability among the servers in S U . In the second phase the player allows linkability and therefore transaction commitment with all servers in S U , while preserving anonymity (for future transactions).