Communications of the ACM
An Efficient System for Non-transferable Anonymous Credentials with Optional Anonymity Revocation
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
How to win the clonewars: efficient periodic n-times anonymous authentication
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Enhanced privacy id: a direct anonymous attestation scheme with enhanced revocation capabilities
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
A practical scheme for non-interactive verifiable secret sharing
SFCS '87 Proceedings of the 28th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
PEREA: towards practical TTP-free revocation in anonymous authentication
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Anonymous Transactions in Computer Networks
SSS '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems
BLAC: Revoking Repeatedly Misbehaving Anonymous Users without Relying on TTPs
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Nymble: Blocking Misbehaving Users in Anonymizing Networks
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Brief announcement: arbitrators in the security infrastructure
SSS'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems
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Traditional public key infrastructure is an example for basing the security of communication among users and servers on trusting a Certificate Authority (CA) which is a Trusted Authority (TA). A traditional, centralized CA or TA should only be involved in a setup stage for communication, or risk causing a bottleneck. Peer to peer assistance may replace the CA during the actual communication transactions. We introduce such assistants that we call arbitrators. Arbitrators are semi-trusted entities that facilitate communication or business transactions. The communicating parties, users and servers, agree before a communication transaction on a set of arbitrators that they trust (reputation systems may support their choice). Then, the arbitrators receive resources, e.g. a deposit, and a service level agreement between participants such that the resources of a participant are returned if and only if the participant acts according to the agreement. We demonstrate the usage of arbitrators in the scope of conditional (positive) anonymity. A user may interact anonymously with a server as long as the terms for anonymous communication are honored. In case the server finds a violation of the terms, the server proves to the arbitrators that a violation took place and the arbitrators publish the identity of the user. Since the arbitrators may be corrupted, the scheme ensures that only a large enough set of arbitrators may reveal user's identity, which is the deposited resource in the case of conditional anonymity.