Cryptanalytic Time/Memory/Data Tradeoffs for Stream Ciphers
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Real Time Cryptanalysis of A5/1 on a PC
FSE '00 Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Time-Memory trade-offs: false alarm detection using checkpoints
INDOCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Cryptology in India
Rigorous bounds on cryptanalytic time/memory tradeoffs
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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Hashing or encrypting a key or a password is a vital part in most network security protocols. The most practical generic attack on such schemes is a time memory trade-off attack. Such an attack inverts any one-way function using a trade-off between memory and execution time. Existing techniques include the Hellman attack and the rainbow attack, where the latter uses different reduction functions ("colours") within a table. This work investigates the possibility of reusing colours, i.e., repeating the reduction functions, in the rainbow attack. We show how this outperforms the Hellman and the rainbow attack in a model of fixed resources. We try to characterize exactly when this improvement appears and in such a case the choice of an optimal number of colours.