A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The random oracle methodology, revisited (preliminary version)
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Cryptanalysis of a Fast Public Key Cryptosystem Presented at SAC '97
SAC '98 Proceedings of the Selected Areas in Cryptography
Optimal Security Proofs for PSS and Other Signature Schemes
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Fault Attacks on RSA Signatures with Partially Unknown Messages
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
The exact security of digital signatures-how to sign with RSA and Rabin
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
On the impossibility of instantiating PSS in the standard model
PKC'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Practice and theory in public key cryptography conference on Public key cryptography
An efficient CRT-RSA algorithm secure against power and fault attacks
Journal of Systems and Software
Attacking RSA---CRT signatures with faults on montgomery multiplication
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
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A fault attack consists in inducing hardware malfunctions in order to recover secrets from electronic devices. One of the most famous fault attack is Bellcore's attack against RSA with CRT; it consists in inducing a fault modulo p but not modulo q at signature generation step; then by taking a gcd the attacker can recover the factorization of N = pq . The Bellcore attack applies to any encoding function that is deterministic, for example FDH. Recently, the attack was extended to randomized encodings based on the iso/iec 9796-2 signature standard. Extending the attack to other randomized encodings remains an open problem. In this paper, we show that the Bellcore attack cannot be applied to the PSS encoding; namely we show that PSS is provably secure against random fault attacks in the random oracle model, assuming that inverting RSA is hard.