Policy Disputes in Path-Vector Protocols
ICNP '99 Proceedings of the Seventh Annual International Conference on Network Protocols
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Incentive-compatible interdomain routing
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Distributed Computing - Special issue: PODC 02
An incentive mechanism for message relaying in unstructured peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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We present an incentive model for route distribution in the context of path vector routing protocols and focus on the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). We model BGP route distribution and computation using a game in which a BGP speaker advertises its prefix to its direct neighbors promising them a reward for further distributing the route deeper into the network. The result of this cascaded route distribution is an advertised prefix and hence reachability of the BGP speaker. We first study the convergence of BGP protocol dynamics to a unique outcome tree in the defined game. We then study the existence of equilibria in the full information game considering competition dynamics focusing on the simplest two classes of graphs: 1) the line (and the tree) graphs which involve no competition, and 2) the ring graph which involves competition.