Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Zero-knowledge proofs of identity
Journal of Cryptology
Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Resettable zero-knowledge (extended abstract)
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A New Identification Scheme Based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem
ACISP '02 Proceedings of the 7th Australian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
A Modification of the Fiat-Shamir Scheme
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Provably Secure and Practical Identification Schemes and Corresponding Signature Schemes
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Identification Protocols Secure against Reset Attacks
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Identity-based identification without random oracles
ICCSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Computational Science and Its Applications - Volume Part II
The power of identification schemes
PKC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography
A variant of schnorr identity-based identification scheme with tight reduction
FGIT'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Future Generation Information Technology
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The notion of identity-based cryptography was put forward by Shamir in 1984. This setting has also been considered in identification schemes. Since then, many identity-based identification schemes have been proposed. Nonetheless, most of them only resist against concurrent attacks. In this paper, we consider the most stringent attack in identification schemes, namely the reset attacks. The aim of this paper is to present the first identity-based identification scheme that is provably secure against concurrent-reset attacks (CR1) based on the 2-SDH assumption. We shall elaborate the 2-SDH assumption, which is weaker than the well known q-SDH assumption.