Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Identification and Signatures for Smart Cards
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Identification Protocols Secure against Reset Attacks
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Efficiency improvements for signature schemes with tight security reductions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Efficient Signature Schemes with Tight Reductions to the Diffie-Hellman Problems
Journal of Cryptology
An Efficient and Provable Secure Identity-Based Identification Scheme in the Standard Model
EuroPKI '08 Proceedings of the 5th European PKI workshop on Public Key Infrastructure: Theory and Practice
A new framework for the design and analysis of identity-based identification schemes
Theoretical Computer Science
An Identification Scheme with Tight Reduction
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Identity-Based Identification Scheme Secure against Concurrent-Reset Attacks without Random Oracles
Information Security Applications
Adaptively secure identity-based identification from lattices without random oracles
SCN'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Security and cryptography for networks
Identity-based identification without random oracles
ICCSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Computational Science and Its Applications - Volume Part II
The power of identification schemes
PKC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography
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Using the rewinding technique from Reset Lemma, Schnorr identity-based identification (IBI) can be proven secure against impersonation under passive attack, and active and concurrent attacks if the discrete logarithm problem and one-more discrete logarithm problem are hard in the random oracle model respectively. However, its security reduction is not tight. In this paper, we propose a variant of Schnorr IBI scheme and provide a direct proof with tight security reduction. In particular, we show that with only three additional elements in the system parameters, the proposed scheme can be proven secure against impersonation under passive attack, and active and concurrent attacks if the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in the random oracle model. This proving technique may also be applied on other IBI schemes.