Digital Beamforming in Wireless Communications
Digital Beamforming in Wireless Communications
Wireless Communications: Principles and Practice
Wireless Communications: Principles and Practice
Ad Hoc Wireless Networks: Architectures and Protocols
Ad Hoc Wireless Networks: Architectures and Protocols
Fundamentals of wireless communication
Fundamentals of wireless communication
Physical layer security: coalitional games for distributed cooperation
WiOPT'09 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks
Correlated jamming on MIMO Gaussian fading channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Multiple-Access Channels With Confidential Messages
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Secure Communication Over Fading Channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
On the Secrecy Capacity of Fading Channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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Physical layer security aspects of wireless networks have recently attracted an increased attention due to the emergence of large-scale decentralized networks. While most existing literature focuses on link-level performance analysis from the perspective of the wireless users, this paper turns the attention to the eavesdroppers' (attacker) side of the problem. In this context, we introduce a model that enables a number of single antenna eavesdroppers in a wireless network to cooperate, by performing distributed receive beamforming, for improving the damage that they inflict on the network's wireless users when tapping through their transmissions. We model the eavesdroppers cooperation problem as a non-transferable coalitional game and we propose a distributed algorithm for coalition formation. The proposed algorithm allows the eavesdroppers to take autonomous decisions to cooperate and form coalitions, while maximizing the damage that they cause on the wireless users. This damage is quantified in terms of the overall secrecy capacity reduction that the eavesdroppers incur on the users while taking into account cooperation costs in terms of the time required for information exchange. We analyze the resulting coalitional structures, discuss their properties, and study how the eavesdroppers can adapt the topology to environmental changes such as mobility. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm allows the eavesdroppers to cooperate and self-organize while achieving an improvement of the average payoff per eavesdropper up to 27.6% per eavesdropping cycle relative to the non-cooperative case for a network with 40 eavesdroppers.