Physical layer security: coalitional games for distributed cooperation

  • Authors:
  • Walid Saad;Zhu Hart;Tamer Basar;Mérouane Debbah;Are Hjørungnes

  • Affiliations:
  • UNIK, University Graduate Center, University of Oslo, Norway;Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of Houston;Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;Alcatel-Lueent Chair on Flexible Radio, SUPÉLEC, Gif-sur-Yvette, France;UNIK, University Graduate Center, University of Oslo, Norway

  • Venue:
  • WiOPT'09 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

Cooperation between wireless network nodes is a promising technique for improving the physical layer security of wireless transmission, in terms of secrecy capacity, in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. While existing physical layer security literature answered the question "what are the link-level secrecy capacity gains from cooperation?", this paper attempts to answer the question of "how to achieve those gains in a practical decentralized wireless network and in the presence of a secrecy capacity cost for information exchange?". For this purpose, we model the physical layer security cooperation problem as a coalitional game with non-transferable utility and propose a distributed algorithm for coalition formation. Through the proposed algorithm, the wireless users can autonomously cooperate and self-organize into disjoint independent coalitions, while maximizing their secrecy capacity taking into account the security costs during information exchange. We analyze the resulting coalitional structures, discuss their properties, and study how the users can self-adapt the network topology to environmental changes such as mobility. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm allows the users to cooperate and self-organize while improving the average secrecy capacity per user up to 25.32% relative to the non-cooperative case.