Wiretap channel type II with an active eavesdropper

Authors:
Vaneet Aggarwal;Lifeng Lai;A. Robert Calderbank;H. Vincent Poor
Affiliations:
Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ;Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ;Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ;Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Venue:
ISIT'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Symposium on Information Theory - Volume 3
Year:
2009

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Abstract

The wiretap channel type II with an active eavesdropper is considered in this paper. Compared with the eavesdropper model considered in much of the literature, the eavesdropper considered here can not only overhear but also modify the signal transmitted over the channel. Two modification models are considered. In the first model, the eavesdropper erases the bits it observes. In the second model, the eavesdropper modifies the bits it observes. For this channel with memory (introduced by the activity of the eavesdropper), one should conduct the worst case scenario analysis. Novel concatenated coding schemes that provide perfect security for the communications are developed for both models to give bounds on the achievable secrecy rate. The technique to modify the inner code to maintain the secrecy properties of the outer code may be of independent interest.