Arbitrary jamming can preclude secure communication

Authors:
Ebrahim MolavianJazi;Matthieu Bloch;J. Nicholas Laneman
Affiliations:
Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN;School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology and GT-CNRS, UMI, France;Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN
Venue:
Allerton'09 Proceedings of the 47th annual Allerton conference on Communication, control, and computing
Year:
2009

Citing 5
Cited 0

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Abstract

We investigate the effect of certain active attacks on the secrecy capacity of wiretap channels by considering arbitrarily varying wiretap channels. We establish a lower bound for the secrecy capacity with randomized coding of a class of such channels and an upper bound for that of all such channels. We show that if the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel possesses a bad "averaged" state, namely one in which the legitimate receiver is degraded with respect to the eavesdropper, then secure communication is not possible.