The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
M-Convex Function on Generalized Polymatroid
Mathematics of Operations Research
Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models
Discrete Mathematics
Relationship of M-/L-convex functions with discrete convex functions by Miller and Favati-Tardella
Discrete Applied Mathematics - Special issue on selected papers from First Japanese-Hungarian Symposium for Discrete Mathematics and its Applications
Erratum: The Stable Allocation (or Ordinal Transportation) Problem
Mathematics of Operations Research
A fixed-point approach to stable matchings and some applications
Mathematics of Operations Research
Discrete Convex Analysis: Monographs on Discrete Mathematics and Applications 10
Discrete Convex Analysis: Monographs on Discrete Mathematics and Applications 10
Gross substitution, discrete convexity, and submodularity
Discrete Applied Mathematics - Submodularity
Discrete Applied Mathematics - Submodularity
A Note on Kelso and Crawford's Gross Substitutes Condition
Mathematics of Operations Research
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In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two standard models: (i) the marriage model due to Gale and Shapley and (ii) the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik. Recently, Eriksson and Karlander introduced a hybrid model, which was further generalized by Sotomayor. In this paper, we propose a common generalization of these models by utilizing the framework of discrete convex analysis introduced by Murota, and verify the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome in our general model.