The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Student admissions and faculty recruitment
Theoretical Computer Science - Discrete applied problems, florilegium for E. Goles
A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Finite termination of "augmenting path" algorithms in the presence of irrational problem data
ESA'06 Proceedings of the 14th conference on Annual European Symposium - Volume 14
The Generalized Stable Allocation Problem
WALCOM '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Algorithms and Computation
A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Transshipment prices and pair-wise stability in coordinating the decentralized transshipment problem
Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions
A direct barter model for course add/drop process
Discrete Applied Mathematics
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Thestable allocation problem generalizes the 0,1 stable matching problems (one-to-one, one-tomany, and many-to-many) to the allocation of real valued hours or quantities. A strongly polynomial algorithm proves the existence of "stable allocations."The set of stable allocations is shown to be a distributive lattice in general, but in the "nondegenerate" case it is a complete linear order. Indeed, in the generic case, when a problem is "strongly nondegenerate," there exists a single stable allocation.A simple algorithm finds "row-optimal" and "column-optimal" stable allocations, given any stable allocation. When a problem is nondegenerate it finds all stable allocations.