Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The complexity of economic equilibria for house allocation markets
Information Processing Letters
On the complexity of price equilibria
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
The spending constraint model for market equilibrium: algorithmic, existence and uniqueness results
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Computing the Arrow-Debreu Market Equilibrium for Linear Utilities
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Market equilibrium via the excess demand function
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the polynomial time computation of equilibria for certain exchange economies
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A path to the Arrow–Debreu competitive market equilibrium
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Complexity results about Nash equilibria
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Market equilibria with hybrid linear-leontief utilities
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Recent development in computational complexity characterization of Nash equilibrium
Computer Science Review
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We consider the computational complexity of the market equilibrium problem by exploring the structural properties of the Leontief exchange economy. We prove that, for economies guaranteed to have a market equilibrium, finding one with maximum social welfare or maximum individual welfare is NP-hard. In addition, we prove that counting the number of equilibrium prices is #P-hard.