The complexity of economic equilibria for house allocation markets

Authors:
Sándor P. Fekete;Martin Skutella;Gerhard J. Woeginger
Affiliations:
Fachbereich Mathematik, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Pockelsstrasse 14, 38106 Braunschweig, Germany;Max-Planck Institut für Informatik, Stuhlsatzenhausweg 85, 66123 Saarbrücken, Germany;Department of Mathematics, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands
Venue:
Information Processing Letters
Year:
2003

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Abstract

We prove NP-completeness of deciding the existence of an economic equilibrium in so-called house allocation markets. House allocation markets are markets with indivisible goods in which every agent holds exactly one copy of some good.