STOC '97 Proceedings of the twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
OceanStore: an architecture for global-scale persistent storage
ASPLOS IX Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Comparing economic incentives in peer-to-peer networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Special issue: Internet economics: Pricing and policies
Farsite: federated, available, and reliable storage for an incompletely trusted environment
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Total recall: system support for automated availability management
NSDI'04 Proceedings of the 1st conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 1
The stable fixtures problem-A many-to-many extension of stable roommates
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
An authentication framework for peer-to-peer cloud
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
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In this work we tackle the problem of on-line backup and storage with a peer-to-peer approach. We propose a novel system architecture involving the users' devices that confederate by pooling their resources and offer an alternative to capital-intensive data-centers. In contrast to current peer-to-peer architectures that build upon distributed hash-tables, we investigate whether an uncoordinated approach to data placement would prove effective in providing embedded incentives for users to offer local resources to the system. By modeling peers as selfish entities striving for minimizing their cost in participating to the system, we analyze equilibrium topologies that materialize from the process of peer selection, whereby peers establish bi-lateral links that involve storing data in a symmetric way. System stratification, colluding peers with similar contribution efforts, is an essential outcome of the peer selection process: peers are lured to improve the "quality" of local resources they provide to reach lower operational costs. Our results are corroborated by both a game-theoretic analysis and a numerical evaluation of several system configurations.