Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Ad Hoc Wireless Networks: Architectures and Protocols
Ad Hoc Wireless Networks: Architectures and Protocols
MIMO Wireless Communications
Game Theory for Wireless Engineers (Synthesis Lectures on Communications)
Game Theory for Wireless Engineers (Synthesis Lectures on Communications)
Resource Allocation for Wireless Networks: Basics, Techniques, and Applications
Resource Allocation for Wireless Networks: Basics, Techniques, and Applications
A game theoretic trust model for on-line distributed evolution of cooperation inMANETs
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Relay and jammer cooperation as a coalitional game in secure cooperative wireless networks
Proceedings of the 5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Dynamic pricing coalitional game for cognitive radio networks
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Networking
Performance analysis of multi-antenna relay communication systems with MRC
International Journal of Communication Systems
A Coalitional Game-Based Mechanism for Forming Cloud Federations
UCC '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE/ACM Fifth International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing
Distributed Matching Schemes for Multi-source and Multi-relay Cooperative Wireless Networks
Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
Energy efficient cooperative communications using coalition formation games
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Cooperation in wireless networks allows single antenna devices to improve their performance by forming virtual multiple antenna systems. However, performing a distributed and fair cooperation constitutes a major challenge. In this work, we model cooperation in wireless networks through a game theoretical algorithm derived from a novel concept from coalitional game theory. A simple and distributedmerge-and-split algorithm is constructed to form coalition groups among single antenna devices and to allow them to maximize their utilities in terms of rate while accounting for the cost of cooperation in terms of power. The proposed algorithm enables the users to self-organize into independent disjoint coalitions and the resulting clustered network structure is characterized through novel stability notions. In addition, we prove the convergence of the algorithm and we investigate how the network structure changes when different fairness criteria are chosen for apportioning the coalition worth among its members. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm can improve the individual user's payoff up to 40.42% as well as efficiently cope with the mobility of the distributed users.