Optimistic protocols for fair exchange
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Experiences Deploying a Large-Scale Emergent Network
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
An Efficient Non-repudiation Protocol
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
PPay: micropayments for peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
PlanetLab: an overlay testbed for broad-coverage services
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Free Riding on Gnutella Revisited: The Bell Tolls?
IEEE Distributed Systems Online
Influences on cooperation in BitTorrent communities
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
Incentives in BitTorrent induce free riding
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
EquiCast: scalable multicast with selfish users
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Maintaining high bandwidth under dynamic network conditions
ATEC '05 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Why markets could (but don't currently) solve resource allocation problems in systems
HOTOS'05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Hot Topics in Operating Systems - Volume 10
An Empirical Study of Collusion Behavior in the Maze P2P File-Sharing System
ICDCS '07 Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Can internet video-on-demand be profitable?
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Characterizing residential broadband networks
Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
OSDI '06 Proceedings of the 7th symposium on Operating systems design and implementation
The Delicate Tradeoffs in BitTorrent-like File Sharing Protocol Design
ICNP '06 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Dandelion: cooperative content distribution with robust incentives
ATC'07 2007 USENIX Annual Technical Conference on Proceedings of the USENIX Annual Technical Conference
One hop reputations for peer to peer file sharing workloads
NSDI'08 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
Peer-assisted content distribution with prices
CoNEXT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference
Do incentives build robustness in bit torrent
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
RatFish: a file sharing protocol provably secure against rational users
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Coordination of cooperation policies in a peer-to-peer system using swarm-based RL
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Content availability and bundling in swarming systems
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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Content distribution via the Internet is becoming increasingly popular. To be cost-effective, commercial content providers are now using peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols such as BitTorrent to save bandwidth costs and to handle peak demands. When an online content provider uses a P2P protocol, it faces an incentive issue: how to motivate its clients to upload to their peers. This paper presents Dandelion, a system designed to address this issue. Unlike previous incentive-compatible systems, such as BitTorrent, our system provides non-manipulable incentives for clients to upload to their peers. A client that honestly uploads to its peers is rewarded in the following two ways. First, if its peers are unable to reciprocate its uploads, the content provider rewards the client's service with credit. This credit can be redeemed for discounts on paid content or other monetary rewards. Second, if the client's peers possess content of interest and have appropriate uplink capacity, the client is rewarded with reciprocal uploads from its peers. In designing Dandelion, we trade scalability for the ability to provide robust incentives for cooperation. The evaluation of our prototype system on PlanetLab demonstrates the viability of our approach. A Dandelion server that runs on commodity hardware with a moderate access link is capable of supporting up to a few thousand clients. The download completion time for these clients is substantially reduced due to the additional upload capacity offered by strongly incentivized uploaders.