An ECDSA pocessor for RFID athentication
RFIDSec'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Radio frequency identification: security and privacy issues
A cryptographic processor for low-resource devices: canning ECDSA and AES like sardines
WISTP'11 Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication
Memory-constrained implementations of elliptic curve cryptography in co-Z coordinate representation
AFRICACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Progress in cryptology in Africa
Evaluating 16-bit processors for elliptic curve cryptography
CARDIS'11 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
A hardware processor supporting elliptic curve cryptography for less than 9 kGEs
CARDIS'11 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
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The Montgomery ladder method of computing elliptic curve scalar multiplication is esteemed as an efficient algorithm, inherently resistant to simple side-channel attacks as well as to various fault attacks. In FDTC 08, Fouque \etal present an attack on the Montgomery ladder in the presence of a point validation countermeasure, when the $y$-coordinate is not used. In this paper, we present an efficient countermeasure that renders the algorithm resistant to this attack as well as to other known fault attacks.