Summary cache: a scalable wide-area web cache sharing protocol
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Space/time trade-offs in hash coding with allowable errors
Communications of the ACM
Graph-theoretic analysis of structured peer-to-peer systems: routing distances and fault resilience
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Mobile Networks and Applications - Special issue: Wireless mobile wireless applications and services on WLAN hotspots
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Securing Mobile Ad Hoc Networks with Certificateless Public Keys
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Design to Minimize Diameter on Building-Block Network
IEEE Transactions on Computers
MASK: anonymous on-demand routing in mobile ad hoc networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
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The network addresses of principals in a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) are conventionally assumed to be public information. This may cause devastating consequences for MANETs deployed in hostile environments. For example, attackers can easily locate a target principal based his known network address and then launch a pinpoint attack. This paper identifies address privacy as a new security requirement to prevent attackers from ascertaining network addresses of MANET principals. We further present Swarms, the first solution to satisfying this requirement. Swarms eliminates the conventionally explicit one-on-one mappings between MANET principals and network addresses and allows any two principals to communicate while blind to each other's address. We quantitatively measure the address privacy offered by Swarms via an entropy-based information-theoretic metric.