Secure verification of location claims
WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
URSA: ubiquitous and robust access control for mobile ad hoc networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback payments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Private Information: To Reveal or not to Reveal
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Protecting privacy during on-line trust negotiation
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Bridging game theory and cryptography: recent results and future directions
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Improved access control mechanism in vehicular ad hoc networks
ADHOC-NOW'11 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Ad-hoc, mobile, and wireless networks
Game theory meets network security and privacy
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
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As privacy moves to the center of attention in networked systems, and the need for trust remains a necessity, an important question arises: How do we reconcile the two seemingly contradicting requirements? In this paper, we show that the notion of data-centric trust can considerably alleviate the tension, although at the cost of pooling contributions from several entities. Hence, assuming an environment of privacy-preserving entities, we provide and analyze a game-theoretic model of the trust-privacy tradeoff. The results prove that the use of incentives allows for building trust while keeping the privacy loss minimal. To illustrate our analysis, we describe how the trust-privacy tradeoff can be optimized for the revocation of misbehaving nodes in an ad hoc network.