Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings on Advances in cryptology
Communications of the ACM
Digital watermarking
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Collusion-Secure Fingerprinting for Digital Data (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Enforcing DRM policies across applications
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Digital rights management
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Secure spread spectrum watermarking for multimedia
IEEE Transactions on Image Processing
Privacy rights management in multiparty multilevel DRM system
Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Computing, Communications and Informatics
Proxy re-encryption in a privacy-preserving cloud computing DRM scheme
CSS'12 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Cyberspace Safety and Security
Unlinkable content playbacks in a multiparty DRM system
DBSec'13 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXVII
A privacy-friendly architecture for future cloud computing
International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing
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This paper describes and contrasts two families of schemes that enable a user to purchase digital content without revealing to anyone what item he has purchased. One of the basic schemes is based on anonymous cash, and the other on blind decryption. In addition to the basic schemes, we present and compare enhancements to the schemes for supporting additional features such as variable costs, enforcement of access restrictions (such as "over age 21"), and the ability of a user to monitor and prevent covert privacy-leaking between a content-provider-provided box and the content provider. As we will show, the different variants have different properties in terms of amount of privacy leaking, efficiency, and ability for the content provider to prevent sharing of encryption keys or authorization credentials.