Applying the generalized Vickrey auction to pricing reliable multicasts

Authors:
Ashish Sureka;Peter R. Wurman
Affiliations:
North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC;North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC
Venue:
QofIS'02/ICQT'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on quality of future internet services and internet charging and QoS technologies 2nd international conference on From QoS provisioning to QoS charging
Year:
2002

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Abstract

Reliable multicast networks scale back the speed at which content is delivered to accommodate the slowest receiver. By extracting information about the receiver's capabilities, the service provider can select which receivers to admit, and at which speed to operate the network. We examine the application of the Generalized Vickrey Auction to pricing reliable multicast and present a distributed method to compute the GVA prices.