The Future of Emarkets: Multi-Dimensional Market Mechanisms
The Future of Emarkets: Multi-Dimensional Market Mechanisms
A network pricing game for selfish traffic
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A Novel Auction Mechanism for Selling Time-Sensitive E-Services
CEC '05 Proceedings of the Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology
Pricing network resources for adaptive applications
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling (Wiley Interscience Series in Systems and Optimization)
Applying the generalized Vickrey auction to pricing reliable multicasts
QofIS'02/ICQT'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on quality of future internet services and internet charging and QoS technologies 2nd international conference on From QoS provisioning to QoS charging
Pricing for QoS-enabled networks: A survey
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Smart pay access control via incentive alignment
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Dynamic pricing incentive for participatory sensing
Pervasive and Mobile Computing
Joint contexts optimization for mobile grid
Computers and Electrical Engineering
Socially-aware market mechanism for participatory sensing
Proceedings of the first ACM international workshop on Mission-oriented wireless sensor networking
Information Systems Frontiers
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This paper studies an auction based allocation of network resources for short-term contracts for heterogeneous network services. The combinatorial winner selection yields the optimal resources allocation in a single-round auction for heterogeneous resources. However, the recurring nature of auction for network services causes least wealthy bidders to exit the auction as they persistently lose under the traditional combinatorial winner selection that focuses only on revenue maximization. Such exits decrease price competition and may cause a collapse of the selling prices and revenues of network service providers. We introduce and evaluate a novel auction based network resource allocation and pricing mechanism for heterogeneous network services. The proposed mechanism prevents collapse of the selling prices and the auctioneer's revenues, stabilizes auction market, and enhances social welfare by allowing larger subset of users to become occasional winners of auction rounds than the traditional combinatorial winner selection does.