Selecting Scientific Papers for Publication via Citation Auctions
IEEE Intelligent Systems
A middleware framework for market-based actuator coordination in sensor and actuator networks
Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Pervasive services
A Fair Mechanism for Recurrent Multi-unit Auctions
MATES '08 Proceedings of the 6th German conference on Multiagent System Technologies
Managing Risk in Recurrent Auctions for Robust Resource Allocation
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on STAIRS 2008: Proceedings of the Fourth Starting AI Researchers' Symposium
Robustness in Recurrent Auctions for Resource Allocation
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on Artificial Intelligence Research and Development: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Catalan Association for Artificial Intelligence
A participation incentive market mechanism for allocating heterogeneous network services
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Fair Mechanisms for Recurrent Multi Unit Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Dynamic pricing incentive for participatory sensing
Pervasive and Mobile Computing
Fair Mechanisms for Recurrent Multi Unit Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on STAIRS 2010: Proceedings of the Fifth Starting AI Researchers' Symposium
Fairness In Recurrent Auctions With Competing Markets And Supply Fluctuations
Computational Intelligence
Multi criteria operators for multi-attribute auctions
MDAI'12 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence
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Many e-services are time-sensitive as the users request them for a specific time period. Such services need to be repeatedly offered to keep them constantly utilized. This paper studies winner selection strategies in a recurring auction for such time-sensitive e-services. We observe that because of uneven wealth distribution, the least wealthy bidders tend to drop out of recurring auction as they persistently loose. The bidders dropping out of an auction decrease competition and can cause a collapse of winning prices. We propose and evaluate a novel auction mechanism that enables bidder drop control. Compared to traditional auction mechanisms, ours increases revenue of the e-service provider and decreases loss of fairness of the e-service allocation.