Managing Risk in Recurrent Auctions for Robust Resource Allocation

Authors:
Victor Muòoz;Dídac Busquets
Affiliations:
{vmunozs,busquets}@eia.udg.es, University of Girona;{vmunozs,busquets}@eia.udg.es, University of Girona
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on STAIRS 2008: Proceedings of the Fourth Starting AI Researchers' Symposium
Year:
2008

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Abstract

Auctions can be used to solve resource allocation problems where tasks have to be assigned to resources in such a way that no resource gets overused and an objective function is optimized. In some cases a robust solution is preferable to the optimal solution as it may still be applicable even if unexpected changes in the environment occur. In this paper we present a robustness mechanism for auctions, producing feasible and near optimal solutions even if non-planned events occur. The proposed mechanism has been used in a real problem obtaining successful results.