Robustness in Recurrent Auctions for Resource Allocation

Authors:
Victor Muòoz;Dídac Busquets
Affiliations:
{vmunozs,busquets}@eia.udg.es, University of Girona;{vmunozs,busquets}@eia.udg.es, University of Girona
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on Artificial Intelligence Research and Development: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Catalan Association for Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2008

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Abstract

Resource allocation problems where resources have to be assigned to tasks in such a way that no resource gets overused can be solved using recurrent auctions. In dynamic environments where unexpected changes may occur, searching the optimal solution may not be the best choice as it would be more likely to fail. In these cases a robust solution is preferable. In this paper we present a robustness mechanism for auctions, producing feasible and near optimal solutions even if non-planned events occur.