A randomized protocol for signing contracts
Communications of the ACM
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Privacy amplification by public discussion
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Founding crytpography on oblivious transfer
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Linear-time encodable and decodable error-correcting codes
STOC '95 Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Comparing information without leaking it
Communications of the ACM
Practical Quantum Oblivious Transfer
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The bit extraction problem or t-resilient functions
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
How To Construct Randolli Functions
SFCS '84 Proceedings of the 25th Annual Symposium onFoundations of Computer Science, 1984
A quantum bit commitment scheme provably unbreakable by both parties
SFCS '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE 34th Annual Foundations of Computer Science
25 years of quantum cryptography
ACM SIGACT News
Quantum Public-Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On the Security of the Quantum Oblivious Transfer and Key Distribution Protocols
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The Search for the Holy Grail in Quantum Cryptography
Lectures on Data Security, Modern Cryptology in Theory and Practice, Summer School, Aarhus, Denmark, July 1998
Cryptanalysis of a new circular quantum secret sharing protocol for remote agents
Quantum Information Processing
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We consider a situation where two parties, Alice and Bob, share a common secret string and would like to mutually check their knowledge of that string. We describe a simple and efficient protocol based on the exchange of quantum information to check mutual knowledge of a common string in such a way that honest parties will always succeed in convincing each other, while a dishonest party interacting with an honest party will have vanishingly small probability of convincing him. Moreover, a dishonest party gains only a very small amount of information about the secret string from running the protocol: whoever enters the protocol with no knowledge of the secret string would have to enter this protocol an exponential number of times in order to gain non-negligible information about the string. Our scheme offers an efficient identification technique with a security that depends on no computational assumption, only on the correctness of quantum mechanics. We believe such a system should be used in smartcards to avoid frauds from typing PIN codes to dishonest teller machines.