Experimental quantum cryptography
Journal of Cryptology - Eurocrypt '90
Security of quantum protocols against coherent measurements
STOC '95 Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Equivalence Between Two Flavours of Oblivious Transfers
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Quantum Bit Commitment and Coin Tossing Protocols
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Practical Quantum Oblivious Transfer
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A quantum bit commitment scheme provably unbreakable by both parties
SFCS '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE 34th Annual Foundations of Computer Science
Quantum oblivious mutual identification
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A proof of the security of quantum key distribution (extended abstract)
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Unconditional security in quantum cryptography
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Quantum Key Distribution and String Oblivious Transfer in Noisy Channels
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The Search for the Holy Grail in Quantum Cryptography
Lectures on Data Security, Modern Cryptology in Theory and Practice, Summer School, Aarhus, Denmark, July 1998
Completeness theorems with constructive proofs for finite deterministic 2-party functions
TCC'11 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theory of cryptography
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No quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol has been proved fully secure. A remaining problem is the eavesdropper's ability to make coherent measurements on the joint properties of large composite systems. This problem has been recently solved by Yao in the case of the security of a quantum oblivious transfer (QOT) protocol. We consider an extended OT task which, in addition to Alice and Bob, includes an eavesdropper Eve among the participants. An honest Eve is inactive and receives no information at all about Alice's input when Bob and Alice are honest. We prove that the security of a QOT protocol against Bob implies its security against Eve as well as the security of a QKD protocol.