Software protection and simulation on oblivious RAMs
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Manufacturing cheap, resilient, and stealthy opaque constructs
POPL '98 Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Watermarking, tamper-proffing, and obfuscation: tools for software protection
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Tamper Resistant Software: An Implementation
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Oblivious Hashing: A Stealthy Software Integrity Verification Primitive
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Dynamic Self-Checking Techniques for Improved Tamper Resistance
DRM '01 Revised Papers from the ACM CCS-8 Workshop on Security and Privacy in Digital Rights Management
Protecting Software Code by Guards
DRM '01 Revised Papers from the ACM CCS-8 Workshop on Security and Privacy in Digital Rights Management
An Approach to the Obfuscation of Control-Flow of Sequential Computer Programs
ISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Security
Software Tamper Resistance: Obstructing Static Analysis of Programs
Software Tamper Resistance: Obstructing Static Analysis of Programs
Remote Attestation on Legacy Operating Systems With Trusted Platform Modules
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Remote attestation on legacy operating systems with trusted platform modules
Science of Computer Programming
The Superdiversifier: Peephole Individualization for Software Protection
IWSEC '08 Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Security: Advances in Information and Computer Security
Tamper-Tolerant Software: Modeling and Implementation
IWSEC '09 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Security: Advances in Information and Computer Security
A graph game model for software tamper protection
IH'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information hiding
Towards tamper resistant code encryption: practice and experience
ISPEC'08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information security practice and experience
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Tamper-resistant software (TRS) consists of two functional components: tamper detection and tamper response. Although both are equally critical to the effectiveness of a TRS system, past research has focused primarily on the former, while giving little thought to the latter. Not surprisingly, many successful breaks of commercial TRS systems found their first breaches at the relatively naïve tamper-response modules. In this paper, we describe a novel tamper-response system that evades hacker detection by introducing delayed, probabilistic failures in a program. This is accomplished by corrupting the program's internal state at well-chosen locations. Our tamper-response system smoothly blends in with the program and leaves no noticeable traces behind, making it very difficult for a hacker to detect its existence. The paper also presents empirical results to demonstrate the efficacy of our system.