Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
An optimally robust hybrid mix network
Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Optimistic Mixing for Exit-Polls
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme: a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
How to break a practical MIX and design a new one
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Analysis, improvement and simplification of Prêt à voter with Paillier encryption
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Correction, Optimisation and Secure and Efficient Application of PBD Shuffling
Information Security and Cryptology
A Commitment-Consistent Proof of a Shuffle
ACISP '09 Proceedings of the 14th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Survey on anonymous communications in computer networks
Computer Communications
TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
An efficient shuffling based eVoting scheme
Journal of Systems and Software
An adaptively secure mix-net without erasures
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
A sender verifiable mix-net and a new proof of a shuffle
ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
A novel method to maintain privacy in mobile agent applications
CANS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Cryptology and Network Security
Multiplicative homomorphic e-voting
INDOCRYPT'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology in India
An efficient publicly verifiable mix-net for long inputs
FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
AFRICACRYPT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Cryptology in Africa
Mix-Network with stronger security
PET'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
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This paper introduces weaknesses of two robust Mix-nets proposed in [10] and [7]. First, we show that [10] can lose anonymity in the presence of a malicious user even though all servers are honest. Second, we show that [7] can lose anonymity through the collaboration of a malicious user and the first server. The user can identify the plaintext sent from the targeted user by invoking two mix sessions at the risk of the colluding server receiving an accusation. We also point out that in a certain case, anonymity is violated solely by the user without colluding to any server. Practical repairs are provided for both schemes. Since such flaws are due to their weak security definitions, we present a stronger security definition by regarding a Mix-net as a batch decryption algorithm of a CCA secure public-key encryption scheme.