Average case complete problems
SIAM Journal on Computing
The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems
SIAM Journal on Computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Resettable zero-knowledge (extended abstract)
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Strict polynomial-time in simulation and extraction
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Universal Arguments and their Applications
CCC '02 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE Annual Conference on Computational Complexity
How to Go Beyond the Black-Box Simulation Barrier
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
General Composition and Universal Composability in Secure Multi-Party Computation
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Session-Key Generation Using Human Passwords Only
Journal of Cryptology
Handling Expected Polynomial-Time Strategies in Simulation-Based Security Proofs
Journal of Cryptology
Black-Box Constructions of Protocols for Secure Computation
SIAM Journal on Computing
On the feasibility of consistent computations
PKC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
On using probabilistic Turing machines to model participants in cryptographic protocols
Theoretical Computer Science
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This paper concerns the possibility of developing a coherent theory of security when feasibility is associated with expected probabilistic polynomial-time (expected PPT). The source of difficulty is that the known definitions of expected PPT strategies (i.e., expected PPT interactive machines) do not support natural results of the type presented below. To overcome this difficulty, we suggest new definitions of expected PPT strategies, which are more restrictive than the known definitions (but nevertheless extend the notion of expected PPT non-interactive algorithms). We advocate the conceptual adequacy of these definitions, and point out their technical advantages. Specifically, identifying a natural subclass of black-box simulators, called normal, we prove the following two results: 1. Security proofs that refer to all strict PPT adversaries (and are proven via normal black-box simulators) extend to provide security with respect to all adversaries that satisfy the restricted definitions of expected PPT. 2. Security composition theorems of the type known for strict PPT hold for these restricted definitions of expected PPT, where security means simulation by normal black-box simulators. Specifically, a normal black-box simulator is required to make an expected polynomial number of steps, when given oracle access to any strategy, where each oracle call is counted as a single step. This natural property is satisfies by most known simulators and is easy to verify.