Practical Byzantine fault tolerance
OSDI '99 Proceedings of the third symposium on Operating systems design and implementation
The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
WWW '03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web
Samsara: honor among thieves in peer-to-peer storage
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Distributed Computing
The peer sampling service: experimental evaluation of unstructured gossip-based implementations
Proceedings of the 5th ACM/IFIP/USENIX international conference on Middleware
BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
SLACER: A Self-Organizing Protocol for Coordination in Peer-to-Peer Networks
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Applying a socially inspired technique (tags) to improve cooperation in P2P networks
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
Tag Mechanisms Evaluated for Coordination in Open Multi-Agent Systems
Engineering Societies in the Agents World VIII
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Evolutionary algorithms based on "tags" can be adapted to induce cooperation in selfish environments such as peer-to-peer systems. In this approach, nodes periodically compare their utilities with random other peers and copy their behavior and links if they appear to have better utilities. Although such algorithms have been shown to posses many of the attractive emergent properties of previous tag models, they rely on the honest reporting of node utilities, behaviors and neighbors. But what if nodes do not follow the specified protocol and attempt to subvert it for their own selfish ends? We examine the robustness of a simple algorithm under two types of cheating behavior: a) when a node can lie and cheat in order to maximize its own utility and b) when a node acts nihilistically in an attempt to destroy cooperation in the network. For a test case representing an abstract cooperative application, we observe that in the first case, a certain percentage of such "greedy cheating liars" can actually improve certain performance measures, and in the second case, the network can maintain reasonable levels of cooperation even in the presence of a limited number of nihilist nodes.