Samsara: honor among thieves in peer-to-peer storage

  • Authors:
  • Landon P. Cox;Brian D. Noble

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI;University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI

  • Venue:
  • SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

Peer-to-peer storage systems assume that their users consume resources in proportion to their contribution. Unfortunately, users are unlikely to do this without some enforcement mechanism. Prior solutions to this problem require centralized infrastructure, constraints on data placement, or ongoing administrative costs. All of these run counter to the design philosophy of peer-to-peer systems.Samsara enforces fairness in peer-to-peer storage systems without requiring trusted third parties, symmetric storage relationships, monetary payment, or certified identities. Each peer that requests storage of another must agree to hold a claim in return---a placeholder that accounts for available space. After an exchange, each partner checks the other to ensure faithfulness. Samsara punishes unresponsive nodes probabilistically. Because objects are replicated, nodes with transient failures are unlikely to suffer data loss, unlike those that are dishonest or chronically unavailable. Claim storage overhead can be reduced when necessary by forwarding among chains of nodes, and eliminated when cycles are created. Forwarding chains increase the risk of exposure to failure, but such risk is modest under reasonable assumptions of utilization and simultaneous, persistent failure.