OceanStore: an architecture for global-scale persistent storage
ASPLOS IX Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Samsara: honor among thieves in peer-to-peer storage
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Farsite: federated, available, and reliable storage for an incompletely trusted environment
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Total recall: system support for automated availability management
NSDI'04 Proceedings of the 1st conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 1
Efficient replica maintenance for distributed storage systems
NSDI'06 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 3
The stable fixtures problem-A many-to-many extension of stable roommates
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Dynamo: amazon's highly available key-value store
Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles
Proactive replication in distributed storage systems using machine availability estimation
CoNEXT '07 Proceedings of the 2007 ACM CoNEXT conference
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Managing a Peer-to-Peer Data Storage System in a Selfish Society
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Off-line incentive mechanism for long-term P2P backup storage
Computer Communications
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In this work we tackle the problem of on-line backup with a peer-to-peer approach. In contrast to current peer-to-peer architectures that build upon distributed hash-tables, we investigate whether an uncoordinated approach to data placement would prove effective in providing embedded incentives for users to offer local resources to the system. By modeling peers as selfish entities striving for minimizing their cost in participating to the system, we analyze equilibrium topologies that materialize from the process of peer selection, whereby peers establish bi-lateral links that involve storing data in a symmetric way. System stratification, that is the emergence of clusters gathering peers with similar contribution efforts, is an essential outcome of the peer selection process: peers are lured to improve the "quality" of local resources they provide to access clusters with lower operational costs. Our results are corroborated by a numerical evaluation of the system that builds upon a polynomial-time best-response algorithm to the selfish neighbor selection game.