Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Wide-area cooperative storage with CFS
SOSP '01 Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
PAST: A Large-Scale, Persistent Peer-to-Peer Storage Utility
HOTOS '01 Proceedings of the Eighth Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems
Samsara: honor among thieves in peer-to-peer storage
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Exchange-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
ICDCS '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'04)
Pastiche: making backup cheap and easy
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
Incentives for large peer-to-peer systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Analysis of user-driven peer selection in peer-to-peer backup and storage systems
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
STACEE: enhancing storage clouds using edge devices
Proceedings of the 1st ACM/IEEE workshop on Autonomic computing in economics
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We study a peer-to-peer backup system, where users offer some of their storage space to provide service for the others. The economic model for such a system is different from the ones applicable to peer-to-peer file sharing systems, since the storage capacity is a private good here. We study two mechanisms aimed at incentivizing users to offer some of their capacity: a price-based scheme (here a revenue-driven monopoly) and a more classical symmetric scheme (imposing users to contribute to the service at least as much as use it). We compare the outcomes of such mechanisms to the socially optimal situation that could be attained if users were not selfish, and show that depending on user heterogeneity, a revenue maximizing monopoly can be a worse or a better (in terms of social welfare) way to manage the system than a symmetric scheme.