Attrition defenses for a peer-to-peer digital preservation system

  • Authors:
  • T. J. Giuli;Petros Maniatis;Mary Baker;David S. H. Rosenthal;Mema Roussopoulos

  • Affiliations:
  • Stanford University, CA;Intel Research, Berkeley, CA;HP Labs, Palo Alto, CA;Stanford University Libraries, CA;Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

  • Venue:
  • ATEC '05 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

In peer-to-peer systems, attrition attacks include both traditional, network-level denial of service attacks as well as application-level attacks in which malign peers conspire to waste loyal peers' resources. We describe several defenses for the LOCKSS peer-to-peer digital preservation system that help ensure that application-level attrition attacks even from powerful adversaries are less effective than simple network-level attacks, and that network-level attacks must be intense, widespread, and prolonged to impair the system.